Personality, Legal Person, and the Coherent Volition Regimen

Legal Person:
An individual or group that is allowed by law to take legal action, as plaintiff or defendant. It may include natural persons as well as fictitious persons (such as corporations)

So, the derivation is personality defining person and person being eligible to be a legal person, subject to a body of law, expected to behave to those laws, and participatory in the process of the law. The body of law itself is rooted theoretically in a social contract, a negotiated quid pro quo of what I can do and can't do and what you can and can't do. The social contract, a baseline reference for rational social behavior, is only a useful fiction. The law is a living thing having many contributing factors including the possible.
Artificial intelligence, having a functional coherent volition regimen (CVR), and the machines it drives have no personality and therefore cannot be any person and definitely not a legal person. Like a dog, which also has a CVR but not a personality, it is subject to the regulation of law, especially in terms of liability, but not participatory in that process. It must be in the 'keeping' of a legal person, or owned as commonly construed, in order to rationalize liability and dangerous behavior and bring smart machines into social and legal accountability, very much as the law treats working animals.
It becomes essential on the force of this argument that we, as persons, agree on the logic that machines, as much as is economically possible, adapt to humans and not vice versa in order to empower humane social existence. We need to negotiate, as a social contract, the role of owner as that of empowered keeper, a steward of a specified domain, usually an object or enterprise, but including smart machines and real property.
On that basis, smart  machines must then, logically and legally, be in the keeping of a legal person, licensed to such a bonded person, in order to effect the redress of liabilities for wrongful action. They may be subject to licensing fees for redress of the social cost of their employment, which is to say, just as a runaway horse's keeper is liable for consequent damage, so a robot's keeper is liable for consequent socioeconomic damage. A smart machine is not a simple drill press. It is closer to a mechanical draft horse.
Next blog: Personality, Player, and the Coherent Volition Regimen
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